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Emerging evidence suggests that many of the clinical constructs used to help
understand and explain obsessive-compulsive (OC) symptoms, and negative mood,
may be causally interrelated. One approach to understanding this interrelatedness is a
motivational systems approach. This approach suggests that rather than considering
clinical constructs and negative affect as separable entities, they are all features of
an integrated threat management system, and as such are highly coordinated and
interdependent. The aim of the present study was to examine if clinical constructs
related to OC symptoms and negative mood are best treated as separable or,
alternatively, if these clinical constructs and negative mood are best seen as indicators of
an underlying superordinate variable, as would be predicted by a motivational systems
approach. A sample of 370 student participants completed measures of mood and
the clinical constructs of inflated responsibility, intolerance of uncertainty, not just right
experiences, and checking stop rules. An exploratory factor analysis suggested two
plausible factor structures, one where all construct items and negative mood items
loaded onto one underlying superordinate variable, and a second structure comprising
of five factors, where each item loaded onto a factor representative of what the item was
originally intended to measure. A confirmatory factor analysis showed that the five factor
model was preferential to the one factor model, suggesting the four constructs and
negative mood are best conceptualized as separate variables. Given the predictions of a
motivational systems approach were not supported in the current study, other possible
explanations for the causal interrelatedness between clinical constructs and negative
mood are discussed.
Keywords: obsessive-compulsive disorder, inflated responsibility, intolerance of uncertainty, not just right
experiences, checking stop rules, negative mood
INTRODUCTION
A number of clinical constructs have been identified and causally linked to obsessive-compulsive
(OC) symptoms (Davey, 2003). These constructs aim to capture the beliefs, attitudes, and
thought patterns associated with OC symptoms, and examples of such constructs include
intolerance of uncertainty (IU; Beech and Liddell, 1974) and inflated responsibility (Salkovskis,
1985). In addition to the aforementioned clinical constructs, negative mood has also been
casually linked to OC symptoms. For example, Salkovskis and Freeston (2001) proposed
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that negative mood may increase the occurrence of intrusive
thoughts, increase the accessibility of negative assumptions,
increase the likelihood of inadequate appraisals and decrease
the efficacy of dismissal, suppression, and other neutralizing
strategies. Whilst on occasion two or more of these clinical
constructs maybe connected together in a causal model (see,
e.g., Lind and Boschen, 2009) more often these constructs are
treated as separable and as having separable causal effects on OC
symptoms. The aim of the present study is to examine if clinical
constructs related to OC symptoms and negative mood are best
treated as separable or, alternatively, if these clinical constructs
and negative mood are best seen as indicators of an underlying
superordinate variable or variables.
Consistent with the idea that constructs are separable,
constructs are usually measured using separate inventories or
subscales (see, e.g., Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working
Group [OCCWG], 1997) and constructs have been manipulated
independently of one another to examine their effect on OC
symptoms (e.g., Ladouceur et al., 1995). Most theories are silent
on any potential relationship between constructs or explicitly
state they believe constructs to be separable (e.g., Summerfeldt,
2004, 2007) and, when constructs are examined together within
a single study, they are usually placed head to head against one
another to see which construct “best” predicts OC symptoms
(e.g., Steketee et al., 1998) – an approach which emphasizes the
supposed separable nature of the constructs and the differences,
as opposed to the similarities, between them. This approach is
often taken in studies even when the relevant constructs have
been shown to be at least moderately correlated with one another
within the same study (e.g., Steketee et al., 1998).
However, emerging research suggests that constructs may
interact to increase OC symptoms and that constructs themselves
may be causally interrelated. For example, using a mediation
model, Lind and Boschen (2009) found that the relationship
between inflated responsibility and checking was fully mediated
by IU. In a series of three experiments that explored the
causal relationships between inflated responsibility, IU and
negative mood, Britton and Davey (2014) found that all
three constructs were causally interrelated. Similarly, Dash and
Davey (2012) found that manipulating negative mood casually
affected the deployment of as-many-as-can (AMAC) stop rules,
whilst Britton (2011, unpublished) found that manipulating
inflated responsibility increases the intensity of “not just right
experiences” (NJRE).
Britton and Davey (2014) interpreted their results within a
motivational systems approach. In this approach emotions such
as anxiety are seen as features of a ‘precautionary system’ that
simultaneously alerts the individual to challenges and threats
to goals, and coordinates cognitive and behavioral reactions in
order that the individual can respond more effectively to these
challenges and threats. Individual threat management systems
such as this will be characterized by a functional coherence in
which perceptual, affective, cognitive, and behavioral processes
work together to reduce the fitness costs of potential threats
(e.g., Frijda, 1986; Keltner et al., 2006). As perceptual, affective,
cognitive, and behavioral elements are all part of an integrated
evolved functional system, we would expect these elements to
be highly coordinated and interdependent, with the affective
experience being an emerging property of the activation of the
various functional elements in the system (Kenrick and Shiota,
2008; Neuberg et al., 2011). Britton and Davey (2014) argued
that if disorders such as OC disorder (OCD) are fundamentally
derived from anxiety as an adaptive emotion then one implication
of the motivational systems view is that emotional, cognitive,
and behavioral elements characteristic of anxiety should be
coordinated and interdependent within the threat management
system relevant to anxiety, and the integrated nature of the
relationships between negative mood and constructs such as
inflated responsibility and IU are supportive of such a view.
Rather than one set of factors (e.g., constructs) being causes
of a different set of factors (e.g., affect), they are all integrated
components of an anxiety precautionary system that promotes
a ‘cascade’ of relevant perceptions, cognitions, behaviors, and
affective experience conducive to solving the adaptive problem
(Kenrick et al., 2010).
The primary purpose of this paper is to further examine
the underlying relationship between four constructs related to
OCD and negative mood. Specifically, the primary aim of the
current study was to examine if these clinical constructs and
negative mood are separable or if they are indicators of a single
superordinate variable, as would be suggested by a motivational
system approach, or, alternatively, if they are indicative of a
different number of underlying variables. Due to the large
number of clinical constructs linked to OCD within the literature,
the authors’ chose to include only those constructs which have
been shown to be casually related to each other and/or with
negative mood within the literature.
In addition to negative mood, the clinical constructs IU and
inflated responsibility were measured in the current study as
evidence suggests they have bidirectional relationships with both
negative mood and with each other (Britton and Davey, 2014).
IU is defined as a “dispositional characteristic that arises from a
set of negative beliefs about uncertainty and its connotations and
consequences” (Birrell et al., 2011, p. 1200) and is underpinned
by appraisals such as ‘uncertainty is dangerous,’ ‘uncertainty is
intolerable,’ and ‘I can’t deal with uncertainty’ (Koerner and
Dugas, 2006). Inflated responsibility is defined as the belief that
one has the power to bring about or prevent subjectively crucial
negative outcomes (Salkovskis, 1985; Rachman, 1998).
Two further constructs were also measured in the current
study as evidence suggests that they are causally facilitated
by negative mood, IU or inflated responsibility (Britton, 2011,
unpublished; Dash and Davey, 2012) and therefore these
constructs may potentially be coordinated and interdependent
within any relevant threat management system. NJREs can be
defined as, “the subjective sense that something isn’t just as it
should be,” an unsettled feeling due to something in the individual
or in the world around them not being right (Coles et al., 2003).
The final construct focused on in this paper is “AMAC” goal-
directed stop rules for checking. Stop rules can be best explained
by linking them to task motivation. Broadly, two specific types
of task motivation have been proposed, performance focused
motivation and task focused motivation (Vaughn et al., 2006).
A performance motivated individual who engages in a task will be
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focused on meeting a certain standard or criteria whilst engaged
in that task. The person motivated in this way is likely to continue
with the task until they have met their given standard or criteria
for that task (e.g., Hirt et al., 1996). In contrast, a task motivated
individual who engages in a task will do so without concern about
evaluation or without any particular performance standards for
the task. A person using AMAC stop rules whilst engaged in a task
(such as checking or worrying) is analogous to someone using
performance focused motivation, the individual’s AMAC stop
rule for that task will encourage them to continue with the task
until they are sure they have met whatever their specific criteria
or standard was for that task.
It is of note that all four constructs measured in the
current study have been shown to have a causal effect on OC
symptoms (Ladouceur et al., 1995; Coles et al., 2005; MacDonald
and Davey, 2005; Toffolo et al., 2013) and each have also
been linked to anxiety related symptoms (Ladouceur et al.,
2000; Coles et al., 2003; Startup and Davey, 2003) making
an exploration of the relatedness of these constructs also of
relevance to anxiety disorders. In summary, the primary aim
of the current study is to explore the underlying relationships
between negative mood and four OC symptom related constructs
which recent evidence suggest are causally interrelated. A threat
management system approach would suggest that each construct
and negative mood would be best depicted as an indicator
of a single superordinate variable whilst, if constructs and
negative mood are separable, we would predict that a five factor
model would be the best depiction of these relationships, with
each of the four constructs and negative mood, respectively,
represented by a single factor. Plausible arguments could be
made for other factor solutions. For example, Summerfeldt’s
(2004; 2007) model of OCD proposes two core, continuous,
orthogonal dimensions to explain the motivational processes
important to the development and maintenance of OCD:
harm avoidance (as characterized by inflated responsibility)
and incompleteness (as characterized by NJRE). This model
would suggest that NJRE and inflated responsibility should be
represented by two separate factors. However, it would be difficult
to predict based on this model if negative mood, for example,
should load onto either of these two factors or a separate
factor.
In order to explore the factor structure underlying the
four constructs and negative mood an exploratory factor
analysis was first carried out in order to ascertain possible
factor structures underlying the relationships between the
four measured constructs and negative mood. Any emerging
plausible models based on the findings of this exploratory factor
analysis were then directly compared with one another using
confirmatory factor analysis.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
A questionnaire booklet was completed by a student sample of
370 participants (male: 74; female: 296). Ages ranged from 17
to 74 years (M = 27.38, SD = 11.96). 48.3% of the sample
in the current study consisted of psychology undergraduates at
the University of Sussex who received partial fulfillment of a
course requirement by taking part in the study. The reminder
of the sample represent other students, university staff, and
university visitors who volunteered to fill in the questionnaire
after being initially approached by the researcher. This latter
groups of participants received the gratitude of the researcher for
participation but were not financially rewarded.
Procedure
Participants were provided with questionnaire-batteries, with
every second questionnaire package reverse ordered. Participants
were asked to supply some very basic demographic information
and to provide informed consent before completing the
questionnaire.
This study was carried out in accordance with the
recommendations of British Psychological Society with written
informed consent from all subjects. All subjects gave written
informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of
Helsinki. The protocol was approved by the ethics committee at
the University of Sussex.
Measures
Intolerance of uncertainty was measured using the Intolerance
of Uncertainty Scale (IUS, Freeston et al., 1994), which was
designed to measure an individual’s IU, particularly the ideas
that uncertainty is unacceptable, reflects badly on a person,
leads to frustration and stress, and leads to the inability
to take action. The IUS has demonstrated excellent internal
consistency (α = 0.94), good test–retest reliability (r = 0.78),
and convergent and divergent validity (Buhr and Dugas, 2002).
The IUS had excellent internal consistency in the current study
(α= 0.95).
Not just right experiences were measured using the Not
Just Right Experiences-Questionnaire Revised (NJRE-QR, Coles
et al., 2003) which is composed of 19 items. The first 10
items measure how often NJRE occur. The next two items
(items 11 and 12) ask respondents to indicate which NJRE
occurred most recently and when it last occurred (past few
hours to past month). The last 7 items in the questionnaire
measure the intensity of NJRE. The NJRE-QR produces two
total scores, NJRE occurrence (composite score of NJRE-QR
items 1–10) and NJRE intensity (composite score of NJRE-
QR items 13–19). Coles et al. (2003) found good internal
consistency (α = 0.79) for the 10 NJRE occurrence items,
and all 19 items showed good convergent and discriminant
validity, evident in stronger correlations with OCD symptoms
than with depressive symptoms, trait anxiety, social anxiety or
worry. In the current sample the NJRE occurrence subscale
showed acceptable internal consistency (α = 0.74) whilst the
NJRE intensity scale showed excellent internal consistency
(α= 0.94).
Negative mood was measured using the Positive and Negative
Affect Schedule (PANAS, Watson et al., 1988) which consists of
two 10-item mood scales. The first is a measure of positive affect
and lists 10 “positive” emotions and the second is a measure of
negative affect and lists 10 “negative” emotions. Watson et al.
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(1988) report that both scales have good internal consistency
(reliability of the positive affect scale ranged from α = 0.86 to
α= 0.90, the negative affect scale from α= 0.84 to α= 0.87). The
construct validity of the scale has been supported (see Crawford
and Henry, 2004). In the current sample both the positive affect
scale (α = 0.87) and the negative affect scale (α = 0.88) showed
good internal consistency.
Inflated responsibility was measured using the Responsibility
Attitude Scale (RAS; Salkovskis et al., 2000), a 26-item
questionnaire that measures general beliefs related to inflated
responsibility. The internal consistency of the scale is excellent
and test–retest reliability is also excellent (r = 0.94, Salkovskis
et al., 2000). Several studies attest to the measures convergent
validity (Salkovskis et al., 2000; Yorulmaz et al., 2002). The RAS
had excellent internal consistency in the current study (α= 0.92).
As-many-as-can checking stop rules were measured using
the Checking Stop Rule Questionnaire (CSRQ, Britton, 2011,
unpublished), a 20-item questionnaire where 10 items measure
endorsement of AMAC stop rules and where 10 measure
endorsement of “feel like continuing” (FLC) stop rules. Britton
(2011, unpublished) reported that two factors underlie the CSRQ,
the first measuring AMAC stop rules and the second FLC stop
rules and that both of these factors are reliable (reliability for
AMAC subscale was α = 0.91, reliability for the FLC subscale
was α = 0.88). The same study found that the CSRQ’s two
subscales correlate in expected directions with other relevant
constructs providing evidence of the CSRQ’s validity (Britton,
2011, unpublished). In the present study the AMAC subscale had
excellent internal consistency (α = 0.91) whilst the FLC subscale
had very good internal consistency (α= 0.89).
RESULTS
Missing Data
There was very little missing data in the sample; overall 99.12% of
the total number of questions were answered across the sample.
Therefore, any missing data was imputed by adding the mean of
the relevant question.
Preliminary Analysis
A preliminary analysis was conducted to examine the Pearson’s
correlation between the total scores (or relevant subscale scores)
on the questionnaire measures of the four constructs and negative
mood. IU, inflated responsibility, negative mood, AMAC stop
rule use, and NJRE occurrence and intensity were all significantly
correlated, with correlations ranging from medium to large in
terms of size (correlations ranging from 0.36 to 0.69, see Table 1).
From this preliminary analysis it is realistic to assume that IU,
inflated responsibility, negative mood, AMAC stop rule use,
NJRE occurrence, and NJRE intensity all overlap and possibly
reflect some underlying superordinate variable.
Analytic Strategy and Treatment
of Categorical Data
In order to explore if the constructs and negative mood
are separable or if they are best seen as indicators of one
(or more) superordinate variables, a two-stage approach was
taken. Firstly, an exploratory factor analysis was conducted to
provide an indication of how many factors may underlie the
data set. Secondly, plausible factor structures (as suggest by
the exploratory factor analysis) were compared directly using
confirmatory factor analysis.
Items entered into a factor analysis should generally be
continuous as opposed to categorical (Kline, 2005). Within the
current study, 10 items were measured on scales with less than
five levels. These 10 items are the first 10 items of the NJRE-
QR. Each of these items ask the participant to state if they have
experienced a specific NJRE within the past month (e.g., I have
had the sensation after getting dressed that parts of my clothes
tags, collars, pant legs, etc., didn’t feel just right) and participants
are simply asked to offer a yes or no response. Kline (2005)
suggests one way to overcome the problem of categorical items
in factor analysis is to parcel items together, that is to create
one or more total scores (linear composites) across a set of two
or more items. These parcels can then be treated as continuous
indicators. It was decided to therefore make two composite
variables (both of which would have a range of possible scores
from 0 to 5). The response to NJRE items 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 were
combined to make a composite score, NJRE occurrence 1. In
support of the combination of all of these items into one score,
all of the individual items were significantly positively correlated
with each other (all correlations significant at p < 0.001). The
responses to NJRE items 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 were combined to
make a second composite score, NJRE occurrence 2. In support
of the combination of all of these items into one score, all of
the individual items were significantly positively correlated with
each other (all correlations significant at p< 0.01). With these 10
variables transformed into two composite scores, all variables in
the data set were now measured on a scale with at least five levels.
TABLE 1 | Pearson correlation coefficients between the total scores on the four clinical constructs and negative mood.
IU Inflated responsibility Negative mood NJRE occurrence NJRE intensity AMAC
IU – 0.59∗ 0.56∗ 0.48∗ 0.44∗ 0.48∗
Inflated responsibility – 0.42∗ 0.36∗ 0.36∗ 0.48∗
Negative mood – 0.37∗ 0.37∗ 0.40∗
NJRE occurrence – 0.69∗ 0.43∗
NJRE intensity – 0.44∗
AMAC –
∗p < 0.001. Two-tailed significance reported.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 September 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 1570
fpsyg-08-01570 September 12, 2017 Time: 15:57 # 5
Britton and Davey The Relationship between Clinical Constructs
Exploratory Factor Analysis
An exploratory factor analysis was performed on the four
constructs and negative mood to explore the factor structure
underlying these variables. All of the 26 items measuring inflated
responsibility (the RAS), the 27 items measuring IU (the IUS),
the 10 items measuring AMAC stop rule use (from the CSRQ),
and the 10 items measuring negative mood (from the PANAS)
were examined in the analysis. In addition, the two composite
NJRE occurrence variables described in the previous section and
the items in the NJRE-QR measured on separate 7-point Likert
scales (items 13–19) were also examined in the analysis (giving a
total of 82 items).
Communalities ranged from 0.50 to 0.84. Fifteen components
had eigenvalues over 1: 23.29, 5.02, 4.59, 3.37, 3.15, 1.97, 1.70,
1.54, 1.36, 1.25, 1.20, 1.13, 1.12, 1.07, and 1.01. The scree plot
was used to determine the optimum number of factors (as
recommended by, e.g., Catell, 1966; Field, 2009). The scree plot
strongly indicated a one or five factor solution over alternative
factor solutions (e.g., a two factor solution or three factor
solution) and so these two possible factor structures were further
explored.
Firstly, a factor analysis was run extracting one factor.
This solution explained 23.29% of the variance. The internal
consistency for this scale was excellent (α = 0.96). Examination
of the factor loadings showed that while most of the items
had moderate loadings (0.40 or above, Field, 2009) on the one
emergent factor, 9 items did not. Of the items which did not load
moderately onto the emergent factor, 7 were from the RAS, 1
from the CSRQ, and 1 from the PANAS.
Secondly, a factor analysis was run extracting five factors
with varimax rotation (a varimax rotation was used to aid with
interpretation of the emergent factors, however, it is of note
that an oblique rotation was also run which produced a nearly
identical factor solution to the varimax rotation. The results of
the oblique rotation are therefore not reported). After rotation
the five emergent factors had eigenvalues of: 12.28, 8.55, 6.65,
6.23, and 5.61. This solution explained 47.94% of the variance.
Looking at the rotated component matrix the resulting scale
produced five reliable subscales each separately measuring each
of the original five constructs; IU, inflated responsibility, negative
mood, NJRE, and AMAC stop rules (see Table 2 for internal
consistency, means and standard deviations on the five scales
and correlations between factors). Of note is the fact that all of
the items thought to measure a particular construct loaded most
strongly onto the factor thought to represent that construct.
Confirmatory Factor Analysis
A confirmatory factor analysis was performed to directly
compare the five factor model and the one factor model.
The one factor model was specified so that all items loaded
directly onto one factor. In the five factor model items were
specified to load onto only one of five factors according to the
pattern indicated by the five factor solution (i.e., all IU items
loading only onto factor 1, or the IU factor, all RAS items loading
only onto factor 2, or the inflated responsibility factor, all negative
mood PANAS items load only onto factor 3, or the negative mood
factor, all NJRE-QR factors loading only onto factor 4, or the
NJRE factor, all AMAC CSRQ items loading only onto factor 5,
or the AMAC factor). In the model all five factors were specified
to correlate with one another (as is suggested in Table 2).
This analysis showed the five factor model is a significantly
better fit than the one factor model,1χ2 (10)= 4840, p< 0.001.
The five factor solution is therefore preferred over the one factor
solution.
It should be noted that neither the one factor nor the five
factor model were an especially good fit to the data using many
conventional fit indices, although observation of these indices
support the findings of the chi-square test, suggesting that the
five factor model is a better fit to the data than the one factor
model. The reason for such poor fit, in relation to both models, is
because a large number of significant pathways were not specified
in the models as doing so would have compromised the point
of the analysis: to test the relative fit of a one factor vs. five
factor model. A list of the significant pathways not added to the
models by type are: correlations between error terms, correlations
between items, correlations between error terms and items (five
factor model only), correlations between error terms and latent
variables (five factor model only), and correlations between items
and latent variables (five factor model only). Values for selected
fit indices for the one factor model are: CFI= 0.51, RMR= 0.22,
RMSEA = 0.08 with 90% confidence interval 0.08–0.09. Values
for selected fit indices for the five factor model are: CFI = 0.79,
RMR = 0.12, RMSEA = 0.06 with 90% confidence interval
0.05–0.06.
DISCUSSION
The analyses reported in this paper demonstrate that inflated
responsibility, IU, NJRE, AMAC stop rules, and negative
mood are best seen as five separate variables rather than as
TABLE 2 | Descriptive statistics for the five constructs and correlations between factors (n = 370).
Internal consistency Mean (SD) 2 3 4 5
(1) AMAC α = 0.91 2.46 (0.90) 0.48∗ 0.48∗ 0.44∗ 0.40∗
(2) Inflated responsibility α = 0.92 3.60 (0.91) 0.60∗ 0.37∗ 0.41∗
(3) IU α = 0.95 1.98 (0.71) 0.47∗ 0.55∗
(4) NJRE α = 0.91 4.72 (3.64) 0.39∗
(5) negative mood α = 0.89 2.59 (0.81)
∗p < 0.001. Two-tailed significance reported.
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indicators of an underlying superordinate variable or variables.
The exploratory factor analysis suggested two plausible factor
structures, one where all construct items and negative mood
items loaded onto one underlying superordinate variable, and
a second structure comprising of five factors, where each item
loaded onto a factor representative of what the item was originally
intended to measure (i.e., all IU items loading only onto factor 1,
or the IU factor, all RAS items loading only onto factor 2, or the
inflated responsibility factor, etc.). A confirmatory factor analysis
showed that the five factor model was preferential to the one
factor model, suggesting the four constructs and negative mood
are best conceptualized as separate variables.
The results of the present study are therefore not supportive
of a motivational systems approach in relation to explaining the
relationships between constructs related to OC symptoms and
negative mood (Britton and Davey, 2014). Such an approach
would suggest that, as the constructs measured and negative
mood are highly coordinated and interdependent within the
relevant threat management system, they should all load onto one
superordinate variable representative of that threat management
system. Rather, the results of the present study suggest the
four constructs and negative mood are separable and therefore
support the fact that each of the clinical constructs are generally
discussed, measured and manipulated separately from each other
within the OCD literature. The results are also supportive of
those theories which suggest that the constructs are separable,
for example, Summerfeldt’s (2004, 2007) model of OCD which
proposes two dimensions to explain the motivational processes
important to the development and maintenance of OCD:
harm avoidance (as characterized by inflated responsibility) and
incompleteness (as characterized by NJRE). In addition, the
results of the present study are supportive of those theories
which suggest that clinical constructs and negative mood are
separable, for example, Salkovskis et al.’s (2000) model which
suggests that inflated responsibility and negative mood are
separate but causally interrelated variables which both increase
the occurrence of intrusive thoughts. Cognitive treatments for
OCD and anxiety disorders are often based on addressing the
types of clinical constructs measured in the current paper (e.g.,
inflated responsibility, Kohlenberg and Vandenberghe, 2007; IU,
Dugas and Ladouceur, 2000). The results of the present study
support the idea that it possible to separately address the clinical
constructs measured in the current study in the treatment of
OCD and anxiety disorders.
The finding that the constructs measured and negative mood
seem to be separable rather than indicators of a core underlying
variable raises a question: how do we explain bidirectional causal
relationships between negative mood with constructs related
to OC symptoms, and the bidirectional relationship between
constructs themselves (e.g., Britton and Davey, 2014), if they are
not indictors of one superordinate variable?
One possibility is that although constructs related to OC
symptoms and negative mood are unique and separable entities
they are entities which to some extent overlap with one another,
as indicated by the fact that all four constructs measured in the
current study and negative mood appear to correlate moderately
with one another. As such, the manipulation of one construct or
negative mood will have a causal influence on other constructs
measured (or negative mood), due to the overlapping relationship
between the relevant constructs and negative mood.
Another possibility is that that while constructs related to OC
symptoms and negative mood represent unique and separable
entities, they are all connected to a third variable which mediates
the relationship between them. One potential candidate for
mediating the relationship between inflated responsibility, IU
and negative mood (Britton and Davey, 2014) is that all three
constructs affect information processing style, and in particular
trigger systematic processing of information. Systematic
processing is a bottom-up, data-driven, and comprehensively
analytic style in which perceivers access and scrutinize all
informational input for its relevance and importance to their
judgment, and integrate all information in forming their
judgment (Chaiken et al., 1989). Negative mood has been shown
experimentally to facilitate systematic processing (Batra and
Stayman, 1990; Tiedens and Linton, 2001; Ambady and Gray,
2002) as have a range of situational and dispositional factors
including responsibility, accountability, desire for control,
personal relevance, and task importance (Sorrentino et al., 1988;
Chaiken et al., 1989; Batra and Stayman, 1990; Maheswaran
and Chaiken, 1991; Lee et al., 1999; Tiedens and Linton, 2001;
Ambady and Gray, 2002) and many of these factors are likely
to be enhanced by feelings of inflated responsibility and IU. For
example, feelings of IU have been linked to increases in desire for
control (Krohne, 1993) whilst increases in inflated responsibility
are likely to lead to an increased sense of task importance
(Salkovskis, 1985). Negative mood in particular provides
information that characterizes a situation as problematic and
fosters the spontaneous adoption of a systematic, detail-oriented,
bottom-up processing style (Schwarz, 1990). Increasing feelings
of responsibility will also signal a situation as problematic and
foster systematic processing (Chaiken et al., 1989) – but only
if the outcomes for which the individual feels responsible are
appraised as having potentially harmful or threatening outcomes,
a characteristic typical of the OC explanatory construct of
inflated responsibility (Salkovskis, 1985). An increase in IU will
increase the desire for control (Krohne, 1993) and this in turn
will also foster systematic processing (Maheswaran and Chaiken,
1991). Thus, inflated responsibility, IU, and negative mood are
all factors that potentially have an integrated relationship with
a specific information processing style which may explain the
bidirectional causal relationships between them. Activation of
that common processing style through increases in inflated
responsibility, IU or negative mood, respectively, is likely to
lead to an increase in scores on the other two constructs, as
all three constructs are associated with increases in systematic
processing. It is also of note that those individuals with OCD and
OC tendencies use a more controlled information processing
style, even under conditions that non-OCD participants use a
speed-oriented information processing style (Soref et al., 2008;
Kalanthroff et al., 2014).
Whilst the four constructs measured in the current study and
negative mood appear to be separate variables, the fact that one
factor explained a good deal of shared variance between the four
constructs and negative mood in the exploratory factor analysis
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is of note. Whilst this factor may have simply been artifact of
shared method variance, it is possible it maybe representative of
a core genetic/biological deficit underlying OC symptoms (e.g.,
Maia et al., 2008) or anxiety related problems more generally (e.g.,
Norrholm and Ressler, 2009).
Finally, the present study has a number of limitations. First,
given a primarily student sample was used in the present
study, it is not clear how generalisable the conclusions of this
study are to a clinical population. It should be noted that
taxometric studies have suggested that OC related symptoms are
generally best considered as dimensional rather than categorical
(e.g., Haslam et al., 2005) and many cognitive models of OC
symptoms follow a dimensional model (e.g., Frost and Steketee,
2002) supporting the appropriateness of studying OC related
phenomena in student samples. However, the validity of the
results presented in this paper would be strengthened if they
were replicated within a clinical sample. Second, the present study
measured only four constructs, and negative mood, and as such
did not measure a number of other constructs that have been
linked to OC symptoms (e.g., thought-action fusion, Rachman,
1993). Whilst this was done as we wished to include only
those constructs which have been connected causally through
experimental manipulation, it should be noted that the inclusion
of other constructs may have led to a different factor structure
emerging in the current study. A related limitation of the present
study is that OC symptoms and anxiety symptoms which have
been linked to the constructs measured in the current study
(e.g., worry) were also not measured. Again, the inclusion of
OC symptoms and symptoms related to other disorders may
have led to a different factor structure emerging in the current
study. Finally, only self-report measures were used in the current
study. Whilst noting the limitations associated with self-report
measures, the authors’ would comment that the constructs
measured in the current study are almost exclusively measured
by self-report in the wider OC literature, and so measurement of
these constructs in this study is consistent with other research in
this field.
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